I Introduction
Concerns over the management of renewable resources have intensified in recent years. Perhaps the most widely publicized example is the loss of tropical rainforests, which have been the focus of international negotiations since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Similar problems have emerged in other contexts too, such as the over-exploitation of fish stocks and wildlife 1 .
Recent proposals to lower tariffs on renewable resources has focused
attention, yet again, on the link between trade and renewable resource degradation.
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Environmental groups fear, among other things, that trade in scarce natural resources has political repercussions that are often ignored by economists. Specifically, it is argued that trade in scarce renewable resources rewards and condones the unsustainable harvesting policies in regimes which are often unrepresentative and undemocratic. 3 On the other hand, free traders argue that trade in scarce resources confers a value upon these commodities and thus creates incentives for better management (see, e.g., Anderson and Blackhurst (1992) ). The growing empirical literature on the impact of trade on deforestation is ambiguous and has not resolved the debate at this stage. 4 Theoretical predictions are also ambiguous, in a second best equilibrium, trade may lower welfare.
5
A recent and growing body of literature suggests that political factors are one of the major causes of environmental damage in countries endowed with a relative 1 Common examples of wild animals threatened with extinction through over-harvesting include elephants (who are harvested for ivory), rhinoceros (who are sought for their horns) and tigers (whose bones and organs are demanded for their presumed therapeutic properties) (TRAFFIC Network Report (1997, 1998) ). 2 For example, chapters 44, 47,48, 49 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule proposes the eventual elimination of tariffs on forest products. 3 The Economist, October 9, 1999. 4 See, e.g., Palo et al (1987) , Burgess (1993) , Barbier et al (1994) . 5 We survey the theoretical literature in the following section.
abundance of renewable resources. For instance, in a survey of environmental policies in ten developing countries Desai (1998) This conclusion is reinforced in numerous other case studies. According to Broad (1998) , timber harvesting licenses in the Philippines were granted to large firms with close links to military and government officials. Moreover, the funds generated from timber concessions have been used to finance electoral campaigns. Similar problems are identified in Indonesia, where logging concessions have been awarded to a small group of conglomerates with close links to the ruling political party (Hafner (1998) ).
Other examples include logging in the tropical hardwood forests of Cambodia, Thailand, India and Malaysia with concessions being granted to politically well connected firms. 6 What these and other surveys reveal is that declining stocks of natural forests have done little to slow the pace of harvesting (Stringer (1994) ).
Moreover, lobbying and political influence are critical in determining who obtains a timber license and how much timber is extracted.
The existing literature has failed to examine the interaction between political factors and the incentives to extract renewable resources. This paper represents a first step in this direction. We take explicit account of environmentalists' concerns about the political influence that industry lobby groups wield. We then investigate whether trade strengthens or weakens the influence of lobby groups on the resource management decisions of a self interested government.
6 Rainforest News Spring, 1999.
This paper develop a political economy model of renewable resource harvesting drawing on Grossman and Helpman's (1994) common agency analysis.
We extend the static version of the model developed by Fredriksson (1997 Fredriksson ( , 1999 , to the case of a renewable resource. Accordingly, it is assumed that a self-interested government cares not only about aggregate welfare, but also political contributions received from lobby groups. Political donations influence the government's decisions because of their many uses such as consolidating power, funding election campaigns and deterring rivals. The weight given to political donations in the government's objective functions may be interpreted as a measure of corruption. It is assumed that the incumbent government determines the quantity of a renewable resource that is to be harvested by issuing a license which defines the maximum allowable harvest. An industry group lobbies the government for greater access to the resource by offering political contributions. The government chooses the harvest to maximize its own welfare.
Since the analysis focuses upon the effects of lobbying by resource extractors, the role of an opposing environmental lobby group is suppressed. As noted by Desai (op cit) this seems reasonable for developing countries where environmental movements are often centered in poor rural communities, which have little influence on policy decisions. 7 Alternatively, the neglect of an environmental lobby group may be justified by assuming that the damage from harvesting is so widely dispersed that it does not induce the affected individuals to form a lobby group. In the parlance of Baron (1994) this represents a particularist policy, where the benefits of harvesting are concentrated, but the environmental costs are so thinly spread that they do not provide sufficient incentive for individuals to organize a lobby group, or make political donations. More generally, this assumption would hold if the external costs of harvesting are non-pecuniary and thinly spread over those who either lack funds or are credit constrained (e.g. the poor), while the benefits of harvesting are pecuniary and concentrated. It is of further interest to note that in developed countries too environmental lobby groups seldom contribute funds directly to either governments or political parties. In a number of countries such as the USA, Australia, New Zealand and the UK environmental groups have received (modest) funds from the government (Reynolds (1998)).
Within this framework we analyze the impact of trade sanctions, on resource stocks under two stark scenarios. First, we consider the case where property rights are well defined and entry into the industry is restricted so that the firm has an incentive to maximise long term profits, taking account of the impact of current harvests on its future payoffs. In the second case, it is assumed that future property rights are not adequately defined, so that the firm myopically maximizes short term profits. We compare the impact of trade sanctions in these two regimes to determine the role of property rights in the political equilibrium.
It is demonstrated that under both property rights regimes, trade sanctions may lead to lower stocks of the renewable resource in equilibrium. Intuitively, this reflects the fact that in a political equilibrium, the contributions of the lobby group mirror the profits that are obtained from a given harvest. When sanctions are imposed, the profits from harvesting decline and political contributions fall. A government that values political donations sufficiently will adopt policies to mitigate the decline in profits and contributions. It does this by increasing the harvest rate. Thus, resource stocks decline in response to trade sanctions. These results suggest that the effect of sanctions may be hard to predict since the impact depends upon the parameters of the problem and institutional arrangements. Caution may therefore need to be exercised in using trade interventions as a resource management tool.
The analysis is based on the following sequence of events. In the political equilibrium, the firm chooses its political contribution and the government sets the quota which defines the maximum allowable harvest. Given knowledge of these parameters the firm then decides its harvest. The model is solved by backward induction.
The remainder of this paper is orga nised as follows. Section II briefly reviews the rapidly growing literature on trade and the environment, while Section III outlines the main structure of the model. Sections IV and V derive the equilibria under long and short run profit maximization by the firm. Section VI provides a simple numerical example of the equilibrium, while Section VII concludes the paper.
II Related Literature
There is a substantial body of literature that examines the interaction between trade and the environment. These studies can be divided into three broad categories. The contribution of this paper differs from previous work in several significant ways. Most obviously, we deal with the influence of a lobby group on policy decisions in a renewable resource context. This contrasts with the existing environmental policy formation literature which has focused on static externalities.
The paper also extends the renewable resource literature by examining the impact of a lobby group on policy outcomes. Rent seeking issues appears to have been largely ignored in most studies of renewable resource management. We attempt to partially fill this gap in the literature.
III The Model
The aim of this paper is to examine whether trade strengthens or weakens the influence of lobby groups on the harvesting decisions of a self interested government.
We therefore consider a situation where the government is responsible for management of a resource and determines the harvest by issuing quotas. The quotas define the maximum allowable harvest in any period. The harvester seeks to influence the government's decisions by offering political contributions to the government.
Let x denote the stock of the renewable resource at a given point in time. The biological growth of the resource F(x), is a function of the existing stock. It is assumed that F xx < 0. 8 Changes in the stock depend on the biological growth rate (F(x)) and the harvest rate (h):
It is well known that under conditions of open access there is a strong incentive for firms to over-harvest a renewable resource. The causes and solutions to this problem have been extensively studied in the literature. However, less attention has been paid to the role of lobby groups on resource management issues. To isolate the effects of lobbying on policy decisions, this paper abstracts from open access problems. Instead it is assumed that a single firm is granted a license to harvest the resource. 9 We begin by considering the consequences of lobbying when the firm's property rights are adequately defined, in the sense that the firm has an incentive to maximise long run profits.
The net present value of the firm's profits are defined as:
where: δ is the given discount rate, p is the given world price of the resource, h is the harvest, b(p, x) is the per unit profits from harvesting which depends on the price (p) and available stocks of the resource (x). S defines the political contributions of the firm in each period. In keeping with the existing literature it is supposed that b p > 0, Schulze (1996) ). Finally, for simplicity it is supposed that the entire harvest is exported overseas at a given world price (p). This assumption allows us to focus on the interaction between trade policy and resource management.
Profits in equation (2a) are maximised subject to two constraints 10 . The first is equation (1), which describes the growth of the resource. In addition, since the government determines the maximum allowable harvest, the harvest rate in any period cannot exceed the allowable quota (h k ). Thus the second constraint is given by:
In what follows, we assume that the constraint in (2b) always binds so that the actual harvest rate depends on the government's allocation decisions.
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For any given harvest rate determined by the government (h k ), the firm will choose its lobbying contributions (S) to maximise the net present value of profits, subject to the constraints in equations (1) and (2b). In the Appendix it is demonstrated that long run equilibrium lobbying contributions satisfy the necessary condition:
In what follows attention is focused only on long run steady state equilibria.
Thus, F(x) = h must be satisfied for the long run equilibrium stock. Note that b(p,x) -
is the usual net bio-economic return from harvesting. Equation 11 If this were not the case, then on the margin lobbying would not influence harvesting.
We begin by describing the welfare maximising equilibrium, which is used as a benchmark for comparison with the lobbying equilibrium. In the absence of lobbying, the government will choose a harvest rate to maximize the net present value of social welfare. Welfare in any period is given by the sum of utility of all agents in the model 12 :
The welfare maximising harvest rate is determined by the solution to:
In a steady state, the long run equilibrium harvest satisfies:
where F(x) = h must hold in the long run equilibrium.
In the welfare maximising equilibrium, the marginal bioeconomic return to the firm is equated to the marginal utility loss from resource depletion.
IV The Political Equilibrium
Having described the welfare maximising outcome, we now turn to the political equilibrium. The government is assumed to be self interested and derives utility from lobby group contributions and social welfare. Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) , the government's objective function is given by a weighted sum of the political contributions it receives and aggregate social welfare. The discounted utility accruing to the government is defined by:
12 Welfare is thus defined by profits plus non-consumptive benefits. Clearly, political contributions, when positive, cancel out, since contributions paid by the firm are received by the government. 13 See the Appendix for details. It is instructive to briefly compare the welfare maximizing harvest, with that under lobbying. Observe that in (6b) terms which relate to the lobbyist's payoffs receive a weight of (1 + α) in equilibrium, while all other terms are given a weight of α. The government therefore behaves as if it were maximizing a welfare function which gives the lobbyist's utility a weight of (1 + α) and that of all other agents a weight of α. Hence, the political equilibrium policy is distorted in favor of the lobby group's preferences. Alternatively, this may be seen by noting that as α → 0, condition is not satisfied, the firm will have an incentive to alter its strategy to induce the government to change the harvest rate, and capture more of the surplus. In the Appendix we show that maximizing (SI) and (SII), and performing the appropriate substitutions, yields the political equilibrium contribution schedule of the lobby group, which satisfies:
Equation (7) reveals that in equilibrium, the change in the firm's political contributions (i.e. S h ), equals the effect of the harvest on its payoffs (i.e. b(p,x) -
). Thus, as noted by Grossman and Helpman (1994) , the political contributions are locally truthful.
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Observe that the contributions required to satisfy the political equilibrium of the game (equation (7)), are exactly equal to the individually rational contributions of the firm as defined in equation (3). This equivalence implies that the individually rational (Nash) contributions that maximise a firm's profits (i.e. (3)), are equal to the contributions necessary for an equilibrium of the political game (i.e. (7)). More significantly, it can be demonstrated that this result generalizes to the case of a lobby group with n > 1 firms. That is, if each firm takes the contribution levels of its rivals' as given, its Nash contribution will satisfy condition (7). This suggests that the political equilibrium does not require contributions from firms in a lobby group beyond the individually rational level. Thus, lobbying is not constrained by freeriding in this model. 17 16 As in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), this can be extended to global truthfulness where contributions accurately represents the preferences of the lobbyist for all feasible h. 17 Free-riding does not prevent lobbying in the model because the political equilibrium is sustained by the profit maximising contributions of each firm. This issue appears to have been overlooked in the literature and it has generally been assumed that lobbying can be undermined by free-riding in this model. Moreover, the political equilibrium is identical whether the lobbyists are assumed to be "groups" representing an entire industry or simply the firms acting individually. Intuitively, this follows directly from the local truthfulness condition . Since the focus of this paper is on resource policy issues rather than free-riding in lobby groups, these important issues are ignored for brevity.
Trade sanction have often been proposed as a tool to reduce harvesting and encourage sustainable resource management practices. The rationale for such sanctions is that they lower profits and thus diminish the incentive to deplete resources (see, e.g., Daly and Cobb (1989) ). We now determine the effect of trade sanctions on the government's harvesting policy in the political equilibrium.
Following Barbier and Schulze (1997) and Schulze (1996) , it is asumed that sanctions lower the price received by the producers of the resource.
Proposition 1: If the government places sufficient weight on political contributions, then trade sanctions can lower the equilibrium stock of the natural resource.
(i.e. A necessary condition for dx/dp > 0 is that F x > 0 and F x is declining in α (i.e.
F xα < 0).) Proof: See Appendix
Intuitively this result may be explained as follows. Recall that α is the weight given to social welfare in the government's objective function. When α is low, political contributions are (relatively) highly valued by the government. If trade sanctions lower prices, ceteris paribus, profits will decline. From equation (7) we know that political contributions are locally truthful and mirror the profitability of any harvest policy. Thus as profits decline, by local truthfulness, political contributions fall. A government that places a high value on political donations will seek to mitigate the decline in profits and contributions. It does this by increasing the allowable harvest and lowering stocks of the resource.
This result has important policy consequences. It suggests that sanctions imposed on highly corrupt regimes, which place a low weight on social welfare considerations, may worsen environmental outcomes. This occurs because a given harvest yields a smaller benefit (i.e. contribution) to the government. If contributions vary with resource access, a corrupt government responds to sanctions by increasing the harvest rate in order to restore its contributions. While this conclusion may seem obvious, it does not appear to have been identified in the literature. The following Section investigates whether this result holds when the lobbyist is given access to the resource for a single period.
V Myopic Firm Behavior
The results in the previous Section are based on the assumption that the firm has secure future access to the resource and therefore has an incentive to maximise long run profits. It is clearly important to determine the sensitivity of the results to this assumption. Accordingly this Section considers the opposite extreme, where the firm is granted a license to harvest for one period. The firm maximises one period profits, which are given by:
where superscript s denotes terms in the short run profit maximizing equilibrium.
Profits are maximised subject to the constraint that the harvest cannot exceed the politically determined quota (h s ): h ≤ h s . 18 As in the previous Section it is supposed that this constraint binds, so that the firm has an incentive to lobby for greater access to the resource. It can be verified that the profit maximizing lobbying contributions satisfy:
18 Since access to the resource is only granted for one period, the firm has no incentive to take account of the impact of its current harvest on future stocks of the resource.
Equation (9) It is assumed that resource growth is logistical:
where, r is the intrinsic growth rate and K is the carrying capacity.
For simplicity harvesting costs are assumed to be linear and are given by:
and the welfare cost from resource depletion is defined by:
Equilibrium conditions (6b) and (4b) define the equilibrium stocks of the resource. These expressions are solved numerically for the parameter values outlined in Table 1 . Table 1 about here Somewhat surprisingly, Table 1 reveals that equilibrium stocks are lower in the long run equilibrium. This may be understood by noting that in the long run equilibrium the firm has a stronger incentive to lobby for greater access to the resource, hence equilibrium stocks are lower. Similarly, the decline in resource stocks is more rapid in the long run case. This again reflects the greater intensity of lobbying in the long run equilibrium. Finally, changes in α (the weight given to welfare) have a proportionately greater impact on stocks when prices are low.
Intuitively, lobbying is most intense when prices are low. If the government is more responsive to lobby group demands (i.e. has a low α) this translates into lower resource stocks.
VII Conclusions and Implications
This paper has examined how trade and lobbying influence the resource management policies of a self interested government. Two extreme property rights regimes were considered. In the first, the harvester was assumed to maximise long term profits. In the second case, it was supposed that the firm myopically maximizes short term profits. It was shown that in both regimes, sanctions lead to lower stocks Finally, it is important to note that the analysis is restricted to the long run steady state properties of the political equilibrium. In a dynamic framework, current actions will depend upon the history of the game. In order to render the analysis tractable, this paper has focused upon steady state equilibria where the history of the game is stationary. 21 It may be useful in future research to explore a political economy equilibrium in which current decisions depend upon a time varying history of the game. This would involve a major extension of the common agency model which may not be amenable to an analytical solution. However, this is a problem which warrants further investigation.
APPENDIX

Derivation of Equation (3):
Given a harvest rate (h), the current-value Hamiltonian of the problem is:
Hb(p,x)hS(F(x)h) =−+− µ (A1) where µ is the costate variable Assuming an interior solution the first-order conditions for the control problem are:
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) , it is assumed that h s > 0. 22 In a long run equilibrium x0 µ == && , using this condition performing the appropriate substitutions and rearranging yields:
Derivation of Equation (4c):
The current-value Hamiltonian of the welfare maximising problem is:
Assuming an interior solution the first-order conditions for the control problem are:
In a long run equilibrium x0 µ == && , thus:
Derivation of Equation (6b):
As noted in the text, it is assumed that h= hk. For notational brevity the superscript (k) is ignored hereafter. The current-value Hamiltonian of the government's utility maximising problem is: H = S + αW+µ(F(x) -h) (A11) Assuming an interior solution the first-order conditions are:
In a long run equilibrium x0 µ == && , moreover, condition (A5) must also hold, thus:
Derivation of Equation (7):
The proof proceeds in three stages. First we prove that dx/dp > 0 only if F x >0. Then it is shown that F x > 0 must hold in the lobbying equilibrium. Finally we demonstrate that F x is declining in α.
After rearrangement, the current-value Hamiltonian of the problem in (SII) is:
The necessary conditions for a long run equilibrium include:
In addition, in equilibrium condition SI must also be satisfied which implies that (A12)-(A14) must hold. Combining and rearranging yields:
Proof of Proposition 1:
The equilibrium condition is given by: Thus by (A21) dx dp > 0 if x Z < 0.
Note that by assumption b x > 0, F xx < 0, b xx < 0 D xx < 0. Hence, a necessary condition for dx dp > 0 is F x > 0.
We now show that F x > 0 in the lobbying equilibrium. Let xx < , then since D xx < 0 it follows that: FF < Now, since xx < , this implies that F x > 0. Finally, we prove that F x is declining in α. Upon differentiating F x with respect to α:
By assumption F xx < 0, thus
To sign x ∂ ∂α consider the welfare function. Recall from the text that as the weight given to welfare, α, increases, the harvest approaches the welfare maximising rate and welfare approaches its maximal level. Thus,
By assumption xx b0,F0,b0,D0 >>>> and it has been shown that x F0 > . Hence 
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